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Abstract
Background: Policy implementation in the context of health systems is generally difficult and the
Kenyan health sector situation is not an exception. In 2005, a new health sector strategic plan that
outlines the vision and the policy direction of the health sector was launched and during the same
year the health sector was allocated a substantial budget increment. On basis of these indications
of a willingness to improve the health care system among policy makers, the objective of this study
was to assess whether there was a change in policy implementation during 2005 in Kenya.
Methodology: Budget allocations and actual expenditures compared to set policy objectives in
the Kenyan health sector was studied. Three data sources were used: budget estimates, interviews
with key stakeholders in the health sector and government and donor documentation.
Results: Budget allocations and actual expenditures in part go against policy objectives. Failures to
use a significant proportion of available funds, reallocation of funds between line items and weak
procurements systems at the local level and delays in disbursement of funds at the central level
create gaps between policy objectives and policy implementation. Some of the discrepancy seems
to be due to a mismatch between responsibilities and capabilities at different levels of the system.
Conclusion: We found no evidence that the trend of weak policy implementation in the Kenyan
health sector was reversed during 2005 but ongoing efforts towards hastening release of funds to
the districts might help solving the issue of low absorption capacity at the district level. It is
important, however, to work with clear definitions of roles and responsibilities and well-functioning
communications between different levels of the system.
Background
Health systems are subject of competing and conflicting
goals and information asymmetry between different
actors, resulting in resistance to systems change [1].
Hence, implementing policies or priorities in the context
of health systems is difficult. In the context of Sub-Saha-
ran Africa, public health care has gone through a period of
increasing shortage of resources for health since the early
1980s. Important problems of public health systems in
these countries are services of poor quality, inequitable
distribution of resources and services, inadequate pro-
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curement systems and inefficient supervision coupled
with a high disease burden [2-4].
Kenya does not seem to be an exception when it comes to
difficulties of implementing policies in the health care
sector, although policy documents are well supported by
accurate data [5-8]. Implementation of the first National
Health Sector Strategic Plan 1999–2004 (NHSSP I) was
far from accomplished. The NHSSP I emphasised the need
to prioritise primary heath care. The allocation of health
resources, however, is skewed in favour of the tertiary and
secondary facilities that offer curative services. Still, rural
health facilities are usually the first point of contact with
patients and provide the major bulk of the health care
services [7,9]. Another example is the failure to meet the
set target of allocating 15 percent of total government
spending to the health sector as agreed in the Abuja decla-
ration. Possible explanations of the weak policy imple-
mentation during the last decade include insufficient
human and financial resources, unrealistic policy targets
and that the health sector has suffered from a lack of polit-
ical commitment, operational management of strategies
and means to evaluate implementation of policies as well
as poor communication between different levels of the
system [5,8,10,11].
Policy implementation can be studied from the perspec-
tive of budgetary processes [12]. Policy makers should
ideally use budgeting as a tool to help implement policies
by understanding the current financial position and set-
ting the best course for the future. Studying budget deci-
sions enables researchers to make concrete comparisons
between budget allocations and policy objectives. "Per-
haps the 'study of budgeting' is just another expression for
the 'study of politics' [...] The opportunities for compari-
son are ample, the outcomes are specific and quantifia-
ble" (Wildavsky 1974, p 3).
What makes a budgetary system is the interaction between
spending and cutting roles according to Wildavsky, 1986
[13]. Roles or the expected behaviour in relation to insti-
tutional position is part of the division of labour. "Admin-
istrative agencies act as advocates of increased
expenditure, and central control organs function as guard-
ians of the treasury" (Wildavsky 1986, p 11–12). This def-
inition of roles is similar to that in agency theory,
commonly used to analyse actors within health care sys-
tems (see e.g. Dranove & White 1987; Gauri 2001; Gauri
et al 2004 [4,14,15]). In the context of health care sys-
tems, providers can be seen as agents or advocates and the
funding body as principal or guardian.
The behaviour of the actors in budgetary systems in differ-
ent countries is affected by overall wealth and predictabil-
ity in the budget environment. Wildavsky, 1986 describe
budgetary processes in different countries based on these
two dimensions. Wealth refers to differences in the gross
national product and predictability refers to the degree of
uncertainty a country is faced with in terms of resources
available for spending versus demand for spending. Budg-
etary poverty implies an inability to generate adequate
resources and budgetary uncertainty implies an inability
to predict the flow of expenditures and/or revenues in the
near future [13].
Objective
The objective of this paper is to assess policy implementa-
tion from the perspective of budget allocations and actual
expenditures in the context of the health care sector in a
poor country. The study is limited to the case of the health
care system of Kenya, more specifically whether there was
a change in the Kenyan governments allocation and
spending of health care resources in relation to their set
priorities in distribution of funds in 2005/06 compared to
previous years.
Whether the situation of weak policy implementation in
the Kenyan health sector was reversed during 2005 is par-
ticularly interesting to study since the second Kenyan
National Health Sector Strategic Plan (NHSSP II) 2005–
2010 was launched in 2005. The new plan is said to be
practically operational and was based on consensus
among policy makers to a higher degree than the NHSSP
I was [11]. Moreover, for the financial year 2005/06 (the
Kenyan Financial Year runs from July to June) the Kenyan
health sector was approved a budget increase of 30 per-
cent. These two facts indicate a willingness to improve the
health care system in the country among policy makers.
Kenya – the case
Kenya is a low-income country situated in Sub-Saharan
Africa. There are 8 provinces and 71 districts in the coun-
try and together with the MoH headquarter they form the
basis of the health care system. The major health care pro-
vider is the MoH, which operates more than half of all
health facilities in the country. The public delivery system
is organised in a traditional pyramidal structure. First level
care is provided at dispensaries and medical clinics. The
next level is the health centres and sub-district hospitals.
Third level care is provided at district hospitals and pro-
vincial general hospitals. There are two national hospitals;
Moi Referral and Teaching Hospital in Eldoret and Keny-
atta National Hospital, located in Nairobi [16].
Resources for health are scarce and the disease burden is
high in the country, just as in other countries in the
region. The estimated total per capita expenditure on
health was USD 19.2 in 20001/02, which is about half of
what is required to finance the minimum health package
set by the World Health Organization [13]. The shortageHealth Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:3 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/3
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of resources for health applies also to real resources. There
are about 5,000 doctors in Kenya, for a population of 32
million, i.e. about 6,400 inhabitants per doctor [11]. The
major source of funding is the households (51%), fol-
lowed by the government (30%) and donors (16%) [16].
Methods
Yin (2003) suggests using multiple sources of data in a
case study for the purpose of triangulation of evidence
[17]. The results in this study are based on both quantita-
tive and qualitative data. Multiple sources (archival
records interviews and documentation) of data were used.
Budget figures (archival records) were used to provide
concrete examples of budget allocations and actual expen-
ditures on health based on hard data. According to Yin
(2003) the advantage of using such data is that they are
precise and quantitative and that they exist prior to the
study [17]. Preliminary and approved budgets and actual
expenditure data was collected from the Ministry of
Finance (MoF) and Ministry of Health (MoH). Prelimi-
nary or printed budgets are estimates that are to be
released by the MoF to all different sectors in June for the
upcoming year. Approved or revised budgets constitute
the actual amounts that are to be disbursed during the
ongoing year and are to be released by the MoF in Febru-
ary.
In total, 12 interviews where conducted with key stake-
holders in the Kenyan health sector. As noted by Yin
(2003) interviews are one of the most important sources
of information in a case study [17]. The respondents were
selected based on their knowledge about and involvement
in the in the Kenyan health sector. All respondents had
senior positions within their organisations and are
regarded to be key informants [17] representing the Ken-
yan health sector. Due to the position they occupied
within their respective organisation and their extensive
knowledge and experience in the Kenya's health sector,
the information generated was assumed to be representa-
tive of the views of the groups, which the interviewees rep-
resented and was therefore regarded sufficient to provide
a holistic picture of the problem being investigated. They
represented the MoF (three respondents), the MoH (three
respondents), multilateral organisations (two respond-
ents) and bilateral donor organisations (four respond-
ents). The interviews were conducted in Nairobi, Kenya,
April 19–27, 2006.
The interviews were semi-structured and based on open-
ended questions of both substantive and theoretical
nature [18]. The purpose of the substantive questions was
to capture the specific features of the Kenyan resource
allocation system and the purpose of the theoretical ques-
tions was to link the features of policy implementation in
the context of the Kenyan health care system to findings in
previous studies.
A review of government and donor documentation, e.g.
National Health Accounts and Public Expenditure
Reviews, was also undertaken to support the findings
from the interviews. The documents were collected during
the interviews and through searches at the website of the
government of Kenya.
Results
The budgetary process in Kenya
The budget process in Kenya is made within the frame-
work of the Medium Term Expenditure Format (A MTEF
is a tool for linking policy, planning and budgeting over a
medium-term at the government level. It consists of a top-
down resource envelope and a bottom-up estimation of
the current and medium term costs of existing policies
[19]). The MoF sets ceilings for all sectors on a three-year
basis. The different ministries participate in working
groups where sector priorities are reviewed and harmo-
nised with national priorities. The MoH present a health
sector review, which should reflect needs of hospitals and
districts, upon which their bidding process is based. In
reality, however, incremental budgeting on a top-down
principle is practised. Figures are not based on costed
activity plans for service delivery but on available
resources from the central level, i.e. the MoF. Funds allo-
cated to the MoH are in turn allocated to the districts and
hospitals by the MoH headquarters with no clear linkages
between the districts and the MoH headquarter [20].
The MoF releases printed (preliminary) budgetary esti-
mates for the upcoming year to all sectors in June. Based
on these estimates, the MoH prepares an allocation plan
that outlines the distribution of expected funds further
down to the districts. In February, the MoF should release
the revised (approved) budgets. There is one recurrent
component and one development component in the
budget for all sectors. The recurrent component should
cover running costs at health centres, dispensaries and
hospitals.
The MoH control the health budget and release funds to
the districts and the two national hospitals. The allocation
to the districts for health centres and dispensaries is in the
form of line-item budgets whereas the hospitals receive
global budgets. The development component is to be
released on a biannual basis and the recurrent component
on a quarterly basis. Salaries to staff are paid for directly
by the MoH. Drugs are also procured centrally, by the
Kenya Medical Suppliers Agency (KEMSA) and then deliv-
ered to the districts [21].Health Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:3 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/3
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The mode for allocating resources is through Authorities
to Incur Expenditures (AIEs) – a government payment
guarantee. The AIEs are issued by the MoH and then paid
for by the MoF through the district treasury. There is no
possibility for the districts or the MoH to spend funds that
were allocated for one financial year during another
period. Funds that are not spent by the end of June are
returned to the MoF [22].
Not all funding for the health sector is channelled through
the MoH. Many donors choose to channel funds outside
the MoH controlled system in order to avoid bottlenecks
in terms of slow disbursement of funds at the central level.
Donors also have control and reporting requirements par-
allel to those by the MoH [20].
Kenyan health policy objectives and targets
The second Kenyan National Health Sector Strategic Plan
2005–2010 (NHSSP II) was launched in 2005 with the
theme "Reversing the Declining Health Trends". The
NHSSP II defines the vision of the Kenyan health care sys-
tem as "Achievement of an efficient and high quality health
care system that is accessible, equitable and affordable for every
Kenyan household" and the mission as "To promote and par-
ticipate in the provision of integrated and high quality promo-
tive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative health care services
to all Kenyans". The strategy is to strengthen primary health
care services in order to facilitate the provision of low-cost
and accessible services in rural areas [11].
In terms of resource allocation, according to the NHSSP II,
resources should be focused at; a) preventive and promo-
tive health services; b) rural dispensaries and health cen-
tres; c) expansion of primary health care; and d)
implementing appropriate policy, financial and organisa-
tional reforms. Among other things, resources should be
shifted from curative towards preventive services [11].
Related to financial and organisational reforms, the MoH
together with collaborating partners are in the process of
preparing for a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) for health
in Kenya.
In the Public Expenditure Review (PER) 2005 specific tar-
gets for reallocation of expenditures in order to focus pri-
ority programmes are set at [21]:
￿ Increasing expenditures on rural health facilities and
preventive health by 15 percent;
￿ Increasing allocation for drugs for rural health facilities
by 18 percent; and
￿ Reducing expenditures on Kenyatta National Hospital
by 3.8 percent.
Budget allocation
The 30 percent increase in the printed budget corresponds
to Kshs 6,542 million (approximately USD 96 million).
According to interviews with senior staff at the MoH, the
increased budget was earmarked for primarily five areas:
￿ Kshs 800 million was earmarked for drugs at all three
levels of care
￿ Kshs 720 million was earmarked for equipment at all
three levels of care. All dispensaries and health centres
should first receive a minimum set of equipment to be
able to deliver such services that are required by first level
care facilities. Then, hospitals should receive whatever is
left according to their priorities.
￿ Kshs 1 000 million was earmarked for rehabilitation of
facilities. The mode for allocating these funds was similar
as that for equipment, i.e. hospitals are getting whatever is
left once health centres and dispensaries have received
their part.
￿ Kshs 290 million was earmarked for immunisation.
￿ Kshs 211 million was earmarked for reproductive
health.
Disaggregated figures covering the year 2005/06 are only
available for the printed budgets. The revised budgets that
should have been available in February were still not
decided in April when the collection of data for this study
took place. Actual expenditures will not be available until
the financial year is over. Thus, comparison over time
based on hard data is only possible using the preliminary
budget allocation for 2005/06. In Figure 1 the allocation
of printed budgets for different items is illustrated for the
financial years 2003/04, 2004/05 and 2005/06. The data
is presented in absolute numbers.
Both in terms of proportion of budget and in terms of
actual funds, curative care account for the largest increase
in allocation when comparing the printed figures over
time. This shows a mismatch between policy pronounce-
ments, where primary care is prioritised according to the
MoH but is allocated minimal resources (see Figure 1).
The fact that allocation of resources for health is skewed
in favour of tertiary and secondary care is also observed in
published reports [7,9].
Budget implementation
There are weaknesses in budget implementation when
printed estimates are compared with revised estimates
and actual expenditures. Generally, there are considerable
gaps between the printed and approved budgets and
actual expenditures, and specifically for the developmentHealth Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:3 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/3
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component. There is an inability to spend available funds
at both central and local levels. This applies to both gov-
ernment and other funding [22,23]. Often, districts tend
to spend funds from those donors who pose the least con-
ditions in terms of controlling and reporting, according to
the interviews. Moreover, in a financial disbursement
assessment report from 2004 it is concluded that there is
a failure to use a significant proportion of available donor
resources in the health sector [23].
For the financial year 2005/06, data on actual expenditure
is available up to quarter two and only in terms of devel-
opment and recurrent components. Comparing the first
two quarters 2005/06 with the same period the previous
year indicates an increased ability to spend. Actual expen-
ditures as a proportion of allocated resources increased
from below 80 percent to slightly above 100 percent over
the period (see Table 1).
In order to cope with funding gaps at district level, during
the financial years 2003/04 and 2004/05 funds were real-
located from rural health and preventive and promotive
services when comparing approved budgets with actual
expenditures. The allocation to curative health constituted
no more than 28 and 24 percent respectively in the
printed budgets whereas it constituted 49 and 46 percent
respectively of actual expenditures (see Table 2).
Although the printed proportion for rural health services
for the financial year 2005/06 is small compared to the
two previous years, it is higher than the actual expenditure
compared to the same period. This implies that if the
budget for 2005/06 is translated into actual expenditures,
there will be a positive development regarding realloca-
tions of funds from curative care towards preventive and
promotive care (see Table 3).
When comparing the printed figures for the financial
years 2005/06 and 2004/05 there is no evidence that the
increment in the latest budget is actually used according
to priorities. Comparing actual expenditures in 2004/05
with the printed budget for 2005/06, however, indicates a
change according to stated priorities. Even though the
printed  proportion for rural health services is small in
Allocation of printed health budget 2003/04-2005/06, million KSh Figure 1
Allocation of printed health budget 2003/04-2005/06, million KSh. Source: MTEF 2006/07-2008/09 [19].
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2005/06 compared to the two previous years, it is higher
than the actual expenditure compared to the two previous
years (see Table 4).
Identified problems with the ability to spend
Problems related to the inability to spend available funds
listed in the financial disbursement assessment report
from 2004 include [23]:
- A lack of information about development resources
available at district level;
- The MoH only release a fraction of the approved devel-
opment budget;
- Fragmented financial planning and allocation processes;
- A lack of qualified staff at the department of finance,
MoH;
- Poor financial and management reporting systems and;
- Procurement difficulties at all levels.
Donors experiment with alternative allocation mecha-
nisms to avoid bottlenecks at MoH and MoF and donor
conditionality for project support does not converge
among different donors. Furthermore, the decentralisa-
tion process that started a decade ago has so far not been
successful in the case of Kenya. The efforts towards imple-
menting a decentralised system have led lead to a poor
match between responsibilities and capabilities at differ-
ent levels of the public health system [23]. According to
the interviews, local authorities are weak in terms of man-
aging capabilities and control over financial resources.
The definition of roles and responsibilities has not been
clear.
Interviews with the key informants indicated that the gap
between allocated funds and actual expenditures is largely
due to a slow release of funds and poor procurement sys-
Table 2: Allocation to different line items – printed and approved budget and expenditures 2003/04-2004/05 and printed budget 2005/
06, million KSh (percentage of health budget)
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06
Printed Approved Expenditures Printed Approved Expenditures Printed
General Admin. and Planning 1 262
(6.0)
1 157
(5.8)
957
(5.8)
1 494
(6.3)
1 536
(7.0)
1 382
(7.2)
2 047
(6.8)
Curative Health 5 911
(28.0)
5 445
(27.4)
7 975
(48.5)
5 590
(23.7)
9 122
(41.5)
8 802
(45.9)
11 497
(38.1)
Preventive and Promotive 2 724
(12.9)
2 038
(10.2)
952
(5.8)
4 241
(18.0)
3 217
(14.6)
1 730
(9.0)
5 261
(17.4)
Rural Health Services 6 571
(31.1)
6 720
(33.8)
2 134
(13.0)
6 443
(27.3)
3 086
(14.1)
2 508
(13.1)
5 380
(17.8)
Health Training and Research 1 770
(8.4)
1 602
(8.1)
1 525
(9.3)
2 558
(10.8)
1 751
(8.0)
1 488
(7.8)
2 074
(6.9)
Medical Supplies Coord Unit 70
(0.3)
69
(0.3)
32
(0.2)
169
(0.7)
135
(0.6)
133
(0.7)
322
(1.1)
Kenyatta National Hospital 2 398
(11.4)
2 409
(12.1)
2 409
(14.7)
2 659
(11.3)
2 659
(12.1)
2 659
(13.9)
2 858
(9.5)
Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital 422
(2.0)
458
(2.3)
458
(2.8)
458
(1.9)
458
(2.1)
458
(2.4)
714
(2.4)
Total MoH 21 127
(100.0)
19 898
(100.0)
16 442
(100.0)
23 611
(100.0)
21 964
(100.0)
19 158
(100.0)
30 153
(100.0)
Source: MTEF 2006/07-2008/09 [19]
Table 1: Actual expenditures as percentage of target second quarter 2004/05 and 2005/06
Q2 2004/05 Q2 2005/06
Recurrent 96.0% 100.9%
Development 6.4% 88.7%
Total 77.9% 100.5%
Source: Quarterly budget reviews, Second Quarter 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 [21–22]Health Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:3 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/3
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tem, which causes delays in spending. Regarding slow
release of funds, the planning capacity is weak at all levels
of the system, according to the interviews with MoH staff.
At the ministry level, the process of disbursement of funds
is slow, which causes uncertainty for the providers and
impede their planning process. Slow release of funds to
the districts has been a bottleneck to expenditures at the
district level. To tackle this issue of low absorption capac-
ity, the MoF allowed for funds to be disbursed on pre-
financing arrangements in 2005, whereby facilities receive
an AIE accompanied with a cheque and this is expected to
facilitate implementation of programmes and increase
actual expenditures [21].
Slow procurement is a planning problem at all levels, but
particularly at the district level, according to respondents
at ministry level. Due to weak confidence regarding the
size and time of the actual release of funds, district level
managers await funding before they procure services
instead of procuring services and pay as funding arrives.
Since the release of funds usually is delayed, procurement
is delayed and in the end there are positive balances on
accounts at the end of the financial year. The current sys-
tem does not allow for the MoH or the districts to spend
funds that were allocated for one specific year in another
period. Funds that are not spent by June 30th are automat-
ically returned to the MoF. At the district level there is not
only weak confidence in the financing system, including
the flow of funds, but also in suppliers of drugs and mate-
rials. The delivery of drugs and materials is viewed as sup-
ply-driven in the sense that the districts do not always
receive what they request but rather what KEMSA have in
store [22].
The authors of the financial disbursement assessment
report from 2004 concluded that there are serious prob-
lems in the financial disbursement system, resulting in a
failure to use a significant proportion of available finan-
cial resources and that these problems cannot be solved
by minor changes. The problems are deeply rooted in the
system and management culture [23]. Other stakeholders
in the health sector share this view, according to the inter-
views with key informants.
Discussion
Public health care in Sub-Saharan Africa has gone through
a long period of increasing shortage of human as well as
financial resources for health. Inadequate procurement
systems, public service delivery that is not accountable
and inefficient supervision are important problems of
public systems in poor countries [2,3]. According to the
results in this study, Kenya is no exception.
Table 3: Comparison of allocation to different line items – printed budget and expenditures 2004/05 and printed budget 2005/06, 
million KSh (percentage of health budget)
Change 2005/06 to 2004/05
Printed 05/06 vs. printed 04/05 Printed 05/06 vs. expenditures 04/05
General Adm. and Planning 37.0% 48.1%
Curative Health 105.7% 30.6%
Preventive and Promotive 24.1% 204.1%
Rural Health Services -16.5% 114.5%
Health Training and Research -18.9% 39.4%
Medical Supplies Coord Unit 91.1% 142.8%
Kenyatta National Hospital 7.5% 7.5%
Moi Teaching and Referral Hospital 55.9% 55.9%
Total MoH 27.7% 57.4%
Source: MTEF 2006/07-2008/09 [19]
Table 4: Policy targets and actual change 2004/05 to 2005/06
Change 2004/05 to 2005/06 Target
Printed 05/06 vs. printed 04/05 Printed 05/06 vs. expenditures 
04/05
Preventive and Promotive -0.5% 8.4% 15.0%
Rural Health Services -9.4% 4.8% 15.0%
Kenyatta National Hospital -1.8% -4.4% -3.8%
Source: MTEF 2006/07-2008/09 [19]Health Research Policy and Systems 2007, 5:3 http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/5/1/3
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Increased resources were provided for the financial year
2005/06, which gave policy makers an opportunity to
allocate increased funds towards prioritised areas without
necessarily cutting from other areas. The allocation of
funds from the central level in the Kenyan health care sec-
tor, however, goes in part against set policies and the real-
locations of funds between line items at district level
creates further deviations between set policies and imple-
mentation. Also in a previous study of health sector
reforms in Kenya it was concluded that there is a large gap
between policy formulation and implementation [8]. In
the current study it was found that that there are consider-
able gaps between the printed and approved health budg-
ets and actual health expenditures in general and for the
development component in specific. A large part of the
gap is explained by delays in the allocation of funds and a
slow procurement system, resulting in an inability to
spend allocated funds. Funds that are not spent by the end
of the financial year cannot be carried forward and spent
in another period. Moreover, a reallocation of funds
towards curative services has taken place. This reallocation
has meant that allocated funds are spent against policy
directions and prioritised areas since it is clearly articu-
lated that resources should be allocated towards primary
and promotive services. Thus, an increased ability to
spend allocated funds might lead to a higher degree of
policy implementation. Efforts towards a quicker release
of funds through disbursements on pre-financing arrange-
ments, which was introduced in 2005, might improve the
absorption capacity at the district level.
Scarce resources for health make it in practice difficult for
policy makers to prioritise one area without cutting from
other areas. In a resource constrained environment, real-
locating funds inevitably creates 'winners and losers', and
thereby tensions [26,27]. But even allocating extra funds
can create tensions as those who do not receive as large
increments as others perceive themselves as losers. Imple-
menting unpopular decisions requires both capabilities
and incentives among those with the task of implementa-
tion. Failure of implementing reallocations can often be
expressed in terms of failure of will as decision makers
lack the will of implementing unpopular decisions [28].
Franco et al, 2002, define incentives as the "will-do" com-
ponent and capabilities as the "can-do" component and
of individual motivation [29]. Capabilities relate to the
extent to which resources including skills are mobilised to
enable the achievement of set goals or priorities. Incen-
tives relate to the extent to which human resources adapt
to those goals and are affected primarily through feedback
related to job performance and work culture. Strength-
ened strategic and operational capacities are necessary for
the capability to act. But having the capability to act is not
similar to having the incentives to act. Both capabilities
and incentives are necessary conditions for change [29-
31].
Current budgeting practises constitute a problem of gaps
and delays in allocation and disbursement of funds at the
district level. Thereby the control over financial resources
at district level becomes weak. Further, weak managing
and planning capabilities and a poor procurement system
carry an inability to actually spend disbursed funds, i.e.
the "can-do" component seems to be weak. The problems
might be related to an unclear definition of roles and
responsibilities at as well as poor communication
between different levels of the system. The current top-
down approach to the planning and budgeting system
means that funds allocated to districts and hospitals by
the central level with no clear linkages between the dis-
tricts and the MoH. Thereby the districts are given direc-
tions that do not necessarily coincide with their
preferences or perceived priorities, i.e. the incentives of
implementing budgets set by the central level or the "will-
do" component might be weak. Also in a previous study
of Kenya it was found that, in order to achieve desired out-
comes of health policy processes, systematic manage-
ment, monitoring and evaluation of processes are crucial
[8].
The interaction between spending and cutting roles con-
stitutes a budgetary system [13]. In poor countries, the
definition of roles might be even more important than in
rich countries.
According to Wildavsky (1986), in poor and uncertain
countries, repetitive budgeting is found. Finance minis-
tries in these countries generally approve budgetary esti-
mates ex ante but when it is time to disburse the funds
payments are delayed. Poverty carries a delay in the dis-
bursement of money and uncertainty carries a need to
reprogram funds repeatedly to adjust to the changing con-
ditions in the system [13]. In such countries, it is often
easier to work with improved roles and responsibilities
rather than overall budgetary poverty and uncertainty. As
Gauri (2001) suggest, in developing countries with poor
quality and inequitable distribution of health care serv-
ices, a key function of the funding body is to define
responsibilities of different types of providers and levels
of care, and organise the available resources accordingly
[4].
Conclusion
Policy implementation in the context of the Kenyan
health sector has been weak for a long period of time. The
first National Health Sector Strategic Plan (1999–2004)
was not successfully implemented and the governments
proportion of expenditure in relation to total government
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ration. In this paper the aim was to explore whether year
2005 was the year of reversing the trend of weak policy
implementation. Even if the will to change is there among
policy makers as a new strategic plan for the health sector
was launched and the health sector was approved a sub-
stantial budget increment this year, this study found no
evidence of reversing the trend. Budget allocations from
the central level partly goes against policy objectives and a
reallocation of funds at the district level creates even wider
gaps between policy objectives and actual spending. Some
of the discrepancy can be explained by a mismatch
between responsibilities and capabilities at different levels
of the system, particularly in terms of low absorption
capacity at district level. Ongoing efforts towards achiev-
ing a quicker release of funds to lower levels of the system
are one way of tackling this issue. What is important, how-
ever, is to work with clear definitions of roles and respon-
sibilities and well-functioning communications between
different levels of the system.
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